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JOHN HARRINGTON
The interval elapsing between the initial apprehension of a
suspect in a criminal case and his appearance before a magistrate
or justice of the peace is becoming a more critical factor in-
fluencing the ultimate disposition of the case, especially in
the Federal courts. Two considerations of grave public con-
cern must be reconciled and balanced. Assurance that crimes
will not go unsolved and unpunished must not override in-
dividual freedom from arbitrary arrest and "third-degree"
interrogations. On the other hand, the pendulum should not
be permitted to swing so far in the direction of individual
liberty that the interest of society as a whole is seriously dam-
aged through the burdening of law enforcement agencies with
unrealistic standards and requirements which hamper their
proper functioning. The enforcement of any law, by its very
nature, imposes a restriction on individual freedom; the amount
of permissible restriction is the perennial problem of the courts
acting as an instrument of society.
The importance of the period immediately following the
initial detention of a suspect by the police has been well
stated.
The psychological moment for a voluntary confession,
as Dean Wigmore has pointed out, comes immediately
after arrest when the prisoner is laboring under the psychic
pressure of guilt and feels most acutely the hopelessness
of his position. At this precise moment, the desire for
relief by making a 'dean breast' is at its height. With the
passage of time and intervention of friend and counsel, a
defense mechanism is set into motion. 1
It is during this period that the police may learn details of other
crimes; of the existence and whereabouts of other participants
in a criminal act while it is not too late to capture them;
whether a crime has been committed or the proper party is in
I Kauper, ludicial Examination for the Accused--A Remedy for the Third
Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1227 (1932).
1962]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:395
custody through a routine check of the veracity of any explana-
tion given.
But such interrogation usually takes place remote from the
public eye. There is the obvious danger that the process of
questioning may develop into the "third degree". Once the
interrogation has begun, the police or other officials are
naturally reluctant to cease until the desired information has
been obtained, regardless of the prisoner's fatigue. The frus-
trated questioner, getting obstinate silence or evasive and im-
pudent replies, is easily tempted to adduce answers to his
questions by threats or actual violence. 2 There are seldom
any disinterested witnesses to testify in court as to what oc-
curred during the interrogation. As the length of the period
between apprehension and judicial examination increases, so
does the opportunity and possibility for third-degree methods
ranging all the way from crude beatings and deprivation of
food or sleep to the less tangible but nevertheless real effects
of being held incommunicado from family and friends for a
lengthy period or being questioned constantly over a great
span of time. Accordingly, judicial attention has been in-
creasingly focused on this period of initial custody and inter-
rogation, and assorted statutes have been enacted attempting
to rectify the evil.
The law concerning the length of detention prior to a magis-
trative hearing has primarily developed along two major lines.
First, there is the liability in tort of the officers responsible.
It has long been settled that unreasonable delay in taking the
person arrested before the magistrate, or in releasing him with-
out charge may constitute a false imprisonment. 3 The second
legal theory prevalent in the cases is that defendants will be
entitled to a new trial because the duration of the detention
was such as to allow a finding that the defendant's confession
was coerced, or that certain other evidence obtained during that
period was inadmissible.
On the Federal level, the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure provide that "an officer making an arrest under a
2 IV NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND EN-
FORCEMENT. REP. No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement, 174
(1931).
3 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment §§ 30, 31.
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warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an
arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner
or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit
persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United
States."4 The crucial words "without unnecessary delay" have
been held not to preclude "booking," quick verification of the
"story" volunteered by the accused and search of his person,
nor a reasonable period needed to reduce to writing an oral con-
fession.6 Moreover, mere delay, although illegal, will not
invalidate a conviction in the absence of prejudice arising from
the detention.' Obviously, the federal statute does no more than
sketch a bare outline. The courts must weigh the facts and
circumstances of individual cases.
What has come to be known as the McNabb rule was
formulated by the Supreme Court in 1943.8 The rule, as sub-
sequently explained and applied, 9 requires that any confession
"made during illegal detention due to failure promptly to
carry a prisoner before a committing magistrate, whether or
not the 'confession is the result of torture, physical or psy-
chological' . .. "must be excluded. 10 This broad exclusionary
rule was carried over to include violations of Rule 5 (a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in Upshaw and in Mallory
v. United States,, I and so would seem to overrule by implica-
tion the lower federal court holding in Morse 12 that prejudice
to the defendant must be shown in addition to the illegal de-
tention. Some limitation on the McNabb rule results from the
holding that confessions made during the period immediately
4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 (a).
5 Muldrow v. United States, 281 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1960); Ginoza v. United
States, 279 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1960).
6 Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
7 Morse v. United States, 256 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1958).
8 McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
0 Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410 (1948).
1Old. at 413.
11 Mallory v. United States, 354 U. S. 449 (1957).
12 Supra, note 7.
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following arrest and before delay becomes unlawful are not to
be excluded under the rule. 13 The McNabb exclusionary rule
applies only to Federal prosecutions, however; it is not a
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Limitation on state
prosecutions. 14 Insofar as confessions in state prosecutions are
concerned, the test of the Supreme Court remains the test of
the voluntariness and uncoerced nature of the confession.' 5
Coercion may be found, however, where the confession comes
after a lengthy interrogation, with the "purpose and under such
circumstances, as to make the whole proceeding an effective
instrument for extorting an unwilling admission of guilt. 1
This is a violation of due process." 1 7
Against the vague generalizations of the federal statutes
and Supreme Court cases, the practice of some states in setting
definite time limits for permissible detention prior to examina-
tion by a magistrate provides a stark contrast. Even under these
statutes however, judges continue to decide cases by scru-
tinizing the particular facts, with the result that the decisions
are frequently as conflicting as those under the broadly worded
federal statute and of the majority of states, which provide
simply for judicial examination "without unnecessary delay."
Examples of the latter type state statutes would be those
of New York and Virginia. The New York statute provides:
The defendant must in all cases be taken before the
magistrate without unnecessary delay, and he may give
bail at any hour of the day or night."8
New York cases construing "unnecessary delay" have held
delays of twenty-four hours and above illegal. 19 The Virginia
13 United States v. Mitchell, 322 U. S. 65 (1944).
14 Stein v. New York, 346 U. s. 156, 187, 188 (1953).
'5 Culombe v. Connecticut, 363 U. S. 826 (1961).
16 Id. at 1076.
17 ibid.
I8 New York Code of Criminal Procedure § 165.
19 People v. Alex, 265 N. Y. 192, 192 N.E. 289 (1934); People v. Snyder,
297 N. Y. 81, 74 N.E.2d 657 (1947); People v. Calebress, 233 App.
Div. 79, 151 N. Y. Supp. 851 (1935); People v. Kelly, 264 App. Div.
14, 35 N.Y. Supp.2d 55 (1942).
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statute, on the other hand, does not mention time; it merely
provides:
*.. and an officer arresting a person under a warrant
for an offense shall bring such person before and return
such warrant to a court of appropriate jurisdiction of the
county or corporation in which the warrant is issued,
unless such person be let to bail... 20
However, it has long been held in Virginia that, under this
section, an officer cannot hold a prisoner for an unreasonable
time before making a return of the warrant. 21
Statutory references to specific time limitations may be
found in California,22 Missouri,23 Rhode Island,24 and New
Hampshire. 25 There are no wide variations in these statutory
schemes. California provides a two day maximum limitation
on what can be a reasonable time, but provides in a related
statute that in any event there must be no unnecessary delay. 26
California decisions under these statutes have not enlarged
upon them.27 Missouri provides a twenty-hour maximum28
while New Hampshire 2 9 and Rhode Island3" have set twenty-
four hour limits for pre-examination detention.
State cases at common law vary greatly as to what consti-
tutes a reasonable, and therefore permissible, detention time.
Five hours has been held lawful in North Dakota3 1 but not
20 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-98 (1950) (Repl. Vol. 1960).
21 Sands & Co. v. Norvell, 126 Va. 384, 101 S.E. 569 (1919).
22 Calif. Penal Code § 825.
23 Mo. Rev. Stat., 1959 § 544.170.
24 R. I. Gen. Laws, 1956 §§ 12-7-1, 12-7-13.
25 N. H. Rev. Stat., 1955 §§ 594:2, 594:19, 594:20, 594:22, 594:23.
26 Calif. Penal Code § 849.
2 7 Dragna v. White, 45 Cal.2d 469, 289 P.2d 428 (1955); People v. Sewell,
95 Cal. App.2d 850, 214 P.2d 1136 (1950).
2 8 Supra note 23.
29 Supra note 25.
30 Supra note 24.
3' Haggard v. First National Bank, 72 ND. 434, 8 N.W.2d 5 (1942).
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permissible in Idaho. 32 Four hours was legal in Michigan. 3 3
Slightly over an hour was held illegal in Massachusetts.34
The discrepancies are partially explained by the peculiar facts
of the cases, such as the necessity for "sobering up" the de-
fendant prior to an investigation and voluntary consent to
remain in police custody for questioning. Moreover, in some
cases the time limit has been set by the jury while in others
the delay has been found reasonable or unreasonable by the
court as a matter of law, there being no facts in dispute.
Delays of two and three days in presenting the arrested person
before a magistrate have been found legal where such delays
were needed to apprehend co-defendants who were still at
large3 5 in order to conduct a full investigation.
In view of the apparent divergence of the state laws relating
to pre-examination detention, it is interesting to note that a
uniform law on the subject was proposed as early as 1942.37
The text of the proposed Uniform Arrest Act dealing with pre-
examination delay reads as follows:
SECTION 11. PERMISSIBLE DELAY IN BRINGING BE-
FORE MAGISTRATE.
If not otherwise released every person arrested shall
be brought before a magistrate without unreasonable
delay, and in any event he shall, if possible, be so brought
within twenty-four hours of arrest, Sundays and holidays
excluded, unless a judge of the [district] court of the
[district] where he is detained or of the [district] court
of the [district] where the crime was committed for good
32 Madison v. Hutchison, 49 Idaho 358, 290 P.2d 208 (1930).
33 Lynn v. Weaver, 251 Mich. 265, 231 N.W. 579 (1930).
34 Keefe v. Hart, 213 Mass. 476, 100 N.E. 558 (1913).
35 People v. Kelly, 404 Ill. 281, 89 N.E.2d 27 (1949); Cf.: Commonwealth
v. Banuchi, 335 Mass. 649, 141 N.E.2d 835 (1957) (necessity for
"sobering up" process to obtain coherent story); Mulberry v. Fuellhart,
203 Pa. 573, 53 At. 504 (1902) (doubt as to detained person's
sanity, necessity for medical examination and report); Peloquin v. Hibner,
231 Wis. 77, 285 N.W. 380 (1939) (person agreed to remain in
police custody).
37 Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315 (1942).
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cause shown orders that he be held for a further period
of not exceeding forty-eight hours. 38
The core of the Uniform Arrest Act was enacted into state
law by the legislature of New Hampshire and Rhode Island
in 1941.39 The Uniform Arrest Act has not been approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws nor have any other states enacted it. Apparently
most states prefer to allow their judiciary freedom to apply and
develop the law in the light of particular fact situations and
the changing attitudes of society, rather than to bind the
courts with a hard and fast rule of law.
Most proposals for removing the possibility of mischief
by the police during detention, while still allowing a fair
investigation into criminal activities, have centered around the
substitution of judicial inquiry for police interrogation.40
These proposals recognize the inherent defects of existing
laws which merely provide for tort actions against guilty
officers or for reversals of criminal convictions. They are
operative only after the initial wrong has occurred; they are
frequently bent or not applied by courts and juries, who be-
lieve a solution to a crime to be the paramount interest of
society; they create disrespect for all law in the minds of
laymen. Other courts, perhaps not completely aware of the
practical problems of law enforcement agencies, frequently
apply these statutes too strictly. Both extreme positions, that
is the too-strict enforcement of concepts of individual liberties
on the one hand and the over-zealous investigation of suspects
by some police agencies on the other, may be corrected if
proposals for something more than a perfunctory and auto-
matic examination of detained persons were implemented. By
removing from law enforcement agencies the temptation to
overstep the bounds of legality in their eagerness to keep the
38 Id. at 347.
39 Id. at 316.
40 Kauper, supra note 1; Pound, Legal Interrogation of Persons accused or
Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1014 (1934);
McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of
Confessions, 24 TEX. L. REV. 239 (1946).
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level of crime down, the individual will be assured the con-
stitutional guarantees of due process. By the same token, a
closer exposure of the judiciary to every-day problems of
crime detection and prevention would perhaps have the
effect on some courts of tempering their mercy with justice.
In both events, society would be the winner.
